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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE UNDER WASHINGTON’S
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
Lee Marchisio
Abstract: Since United States v. Nixon, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a
qualified executive privilege grounded in federal separation of powers. The privilege allows
the President to withhold executive branch communications when disclosure would
undermine presidential decisionmaking while executing core constitutional duties. Several
states have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and adopted an analogous gubernatorial
privilege under state constitutional separation of powers. Focusing on Washington State’s
well-developed separation of powers doctrine and strong populist history, this Comment
argues that the Washington State Supreme Court should recognize a qualified gubernatorial
privilege that also respects the state’s long history of citizen oversight.

INTRODUCTION
The spirit of reciprocity and interdependence requires that if
checks by one branch undermine the operation of another
branch or undermine the rule of law which all branches are
committed to maintain, those checks are improper and
destructive exercises of the authority.1
The separation of powers doctrine is deeply rooted in Washington
jurisprudence.2 It protects each branch of government from
encroachment into its core sphere of competence, guarding against
burdensome checks on its power by the other branches.3 Nevertheless,
the Washington State Supreme Court has so far avoided determining the
extent to which the executive branch may shield its internal
decisionmaking processes from a judicial order to disclose records for
criminal proceedings, civil litigation, or public records requests.4
1. In re Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 243, 552 P.2d 163, 170 (1976).
2. See infra note 229.
3. See infra note 231.
4. “During discovery, [the Washington State Farm Bureau] sought disclosure of many internal
government documents that the State claimed were protected by legislative or executive privilege.
The trial court ruled that such privileges exist, subject to a list of qualifications. Because we resolve
this case in favor of the State, it is unnecessary for us to address this privileges issue, and we decline
to do so.” Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wash. 2d 284, 298 n.20, 174 P.3d 1142,
1148–49 n.20 (2007) (declining to address, in the face of a ripe and fully briefed issue, the merits of
an executive privilege doctrine in Washington state). Because this case was heard on direct appeal,
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In United States v. Nixon,5 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
President has a qualified privilege to withhold executive
communications.6 The privilege presumptively applies whenever the
President formally asserts it in response to a specific request for
information.7 A requestor must then demonstrate a particularized need
for the communications at issue.8 If the requestor can demonstrate
sufficient need, then a court will review the communications in camera
and engage in a balancing test to determine whether the requestor’s
particular need outweighs the public interest in maintaining the integrity
of the President’s decisionmaking process.9 In Nixon, the Court held that
the need for evidence in a criminal proceeding was sufficient to compel
in camera inspection and the subsequent release of admissible and
relevant recorded conversations between the President and his
advisors.10
After Nixon, states have recognized varying degrees of analogous
gubernatorial privilege grounded in common law11 or state constitutional
separation of powers.12 Some states provide a deliberative process
exemption13 that protects communications only insofar as they pertain to
there is no Washington Court of Appeals precedent on executive privilege. Id. at 298, 174 P.3d at
1149.
5. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
6. Id. at 708–09.
7. Id. at 713.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 713–14.
10. Id. at 713–15.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997), comprehensively distinguished between
executive privilege and the deliberative process privilege:
The most frequent form of executive privilege raised in the judicial arena is the deliberative
process privilege; it allows the government to withhold documents and other materials that
would reveal advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Although this privilege
is most commonly encountered in Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) litigation, it
originated as a common law privilege. Two requirements are essential to the deliberative
process privilege: the material must be predecisional and it must be deliberative. . . .
The presidential privilege is rooted in constitutional separation of powers principles and the
President’s unique constitutional role. . . .
. . . [U]nlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege
applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as
pre-deliberative ones. Even though the presidential privilege is based on the need to preserve
the President’s access to candid advice, none of the cases suggest that it encompasses only the
deliberative or advice portions of documents. . . . There is no indication either that the
presidential privilege is restricted to pre-decisional materials. . . . Nor would exclusion of final
or post-decisional materials make sense, given the Nixon cases’ concern that the President be
given sufficient room to operate effectively. These materials often will be revelatory of the
President’s deliberations—as, for example, when the President decides to pursue a particular
course of action, but asks his advisers to submit follow-up reports so that he can monitor
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pre-decisional opinions.14 Under this exemption, factual material
divorced from advisor opinion is generally not protected.15 Furthermore,
once the governor makes a final decision on the relevant issue, the
deliberative process exemption ceases to protect even advisor opinions.16
Other states apply a more robust executive privilege doctrine closely
analogous to that applied in Nixon, which exempts both pre- and postdecisional gubernatorial communications. These states protect both fact
statements and advisor opinions from compelled disclosure.17 They also
protect documents even after a final decision has been made.18
The Washington Public Records Act (PRA)19 guarantees citizen
access to public records of state and local governmental bodies,
including the governor’s office as a state agency.20 The PRA includes a
deliberative process exemption,21 which the Washington State Supreme
Court strictly limits to pre-decisional opinions.22 The Court refuses to
whether this course of action is likely to be successful. The release of final and post-decisional
materials would also limit the President’s ability to communicate his decisions privately,
thereby interfering with his ability to exercise control over the executive branch.
Finally, while both the deliberative process privilege and the presidential privilege are
qualified privileges, the Nixon cases suggest that the presidential communications privilege is
more difficult to surmount. In regard to both, courts must balance the public interests at stake
in determining whether the privilege should yield in a particular case, and must specifically
consider the need of the party seeking privileged evidence. But this balancing is more ad hoc in
the context of the deliberative process privilege, and includes consideration of additional
factors such as whether the government is a party to the litigation. Moreover, the privilege
disappears altogether when there is any reason to believe government misconduct occurred. On
the other hand, a party seeking to overcome the presidential privilege seemingly must always
provide a focused demonstration of need, even when there are allegations of misconduct by
high-level officials.
Id. at 737, 745–46 (citations omitted).
14. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.280 (2012) (“Preliminary drafts, notes,
recommendations, and intra-agency memorandums in which opinions are expressed or policies
formulated or recommended are exempt under this chapter, except that a specific record is not
exempt when publicly cited by an agency in connection with any agency action.”).
15. See, e.g., Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 256–57,
884 P.2d 592, 600 (1994); West v. Port of Olympia, 146 Wash. App. 108, 116–17, 192 P.3d 926,
930–31 (2008).
16. See, e.g., Animal Welfare Soc’y, 125 Wash. 2d at 256–57, 884 P.2d at 600; West, 146 Wash.
App. at 116–17, 192 P.3d at 930–31.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.
19. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.56.001–.904 (2012).
20. Id. § 42.56.010(1).
21. Id. § 42.56.280. The PRA also provides for a civil discovery exemption. § 42.56.290.
22. “In order to rely on this exemption, an agency must show that the records contain
predecisional opinions or recommendations of subordinates expressed as part of a deliberative
process; that disclosure would be injurious to the deliberative or consultative function of the
process; that disclosure would inhibit the flow of recommendations, observations, and opinions; and
finally, that the materials covered by the exemption reflect policy recommendations and opinions
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protect communicated opinions once a final decision has been reached.23
Furthermore, courts reviewing disclosure requests start with a strong
presumption in favor of disclosure and apply the statutory exemption
narrowly.24 This framework is consistent with Washington’s populist
constitutional history.25 The ratifiers of the constitution feared special
interest influence over government and instituted robust democratic
checks on government power.26
The PRA’s liberal construction and its narrow exceptions leave
Washington’s executive branch open to public records requests that
encroach upon its decisionmaking processes and threaten separation of
powers. This Comment argues that the Washington State Supreme Court
should recognize an executive privilege doctrine modeled after the
qualified privilege outlined in United States v. Nixon and grounded in
state constitutional separation of powers. Part I outlines federal
executive privilege history and doctrine. Part II discusses how state
courts have adopted analogous executive privilege doctrines and traces
common themes for demonstrating a requestor’s need for access to
executive decisionmaking processes. Part III introduces Washington’s
populist history and outlines how the Washington State Supreme Court
conceives state separation of powers. Part IV argues that Washington’s
separation of powers doctrine requires executive privilege but that the
state’s populist history should inform that privilege. This history
suggests that any gubernatorial privilege should be qualified, and that
the privilege should protect only gubernatorial decisionmaking processes
that implicate core constitutional functions.

and not the raw factual data on which a decision is based.” Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v.
Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 256, 884 P.2d 592, 600 (1994) (citing Columbia Publ’g Co. v.
Vancouver, 36 Wash. App. 25, 31–32, 671 P.2d 280, 284–85 (1983)).
23. Id. at 257, 884 P.2d at 600.
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2012) (“The people of this state do not yield their
sovereignty to the agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their
public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for
them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the
instruments that they have created. This chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions
narrowly construed to promote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully
protected. In the event of conflict between the provisions of this chapter and any other act, the
provisions of this chapter shall govern.”); Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims, 152 Wash. 2d 421,
429, 98 P.3d 463, 467 (2004).
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. See infra notes 216–27 and accompanying text.
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DESPITE NO CLEAR PRECEDENT, THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT RECOGNIZED EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN UNITED
STATES V. NIXON

The U.S. Supreme Court first outlined the constitutional foundation
for executive privilege in United States v. Nixon.27 The Court grounded
the privilege in separation of powers, but also relied on the functional
difficulties broad disclosure places on the executive to guide its analysis
of individual claims of privilege. State courts draw on this analysis when
determining whether to recognize executive privilege and how to
analyze specific claims of privilege when they do.
A.

The History of Chief Executive Privilege Prior to U.S.
Independence Sheds Little Light on State Executive Privilege
Doctrine

Prior to U.S. Independence, English common law was ambiguous as
to executive privilege. Structural differences between modern popularly
elected state governors and both English Parliament and monarchappointed colonial governors distinguish English precedent. Yet, this
history also demonstrates some balance between the Monarch’s
sovereignty and executive accountability to constituencies beyond the
Crown itself.
As early as 1621, Parliament had the power to inquire into the
activities of the King’s ministers.28 Although parliamentary inquiry was
largely used as a prelude to impeachment, inquiry extended generally to
executive conduct over war making, foreign affairs, and accounting of
public moneys, and was used as a basis for legislation and to evaluate
executive law enforcement.29 Even so, sensitive correspondences, the
release of which could jeopardize foreign affairs, were subject to
delayed parliamentary inspection at least on one occasion.30 Modern
scholars debate whether Parliament’s authority to compel disclosure of
the Monarch’s documents derived from its inherent power or merely
27. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
28. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 15–16 (1974).
29. Id. at 17–20.
30. Compare id. at 24–26 (dismissing the so-called Walpole incident, where Sir Robert Walpole’s
administration withheld certain correspondences from Parliament in order to protect ongoing peace
negotiations with Prussia, as an incident of “transient political control” because Walpole’s successor
later released those correspondences), and Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Reply to Professor
Sofaer, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 605–07 (1975), with Abraham D. Sofaer, Book Review, Executive
Privilege: A Constitutional Myth, 88 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1974) (countering that the later
release by Walpole’s successor could also demonstrate merely “transient political control”).
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from its practical political power.31 This uncertainty may limit the utility
of English precedent for interpreting executive privilege.32
United States colonial precedent is also distinguishable. Although
several assemblies possessed the power of inquiry over the Monarch’s
officers,33 colonial governors, as extensions of the Crown, possessed the
sole power to remove executive and judicial officers.34 The Monarch’s
dominance over the colonies through appointed governors further
undermines the analogy between colonial and state governors.35 In all,
while the structural differences between appointed colonial
administrations and elected post-independence administrations limit the
utility of English precedent, the balance between the sovereign Monarch
and executive accountability was not merely academic prior to
independence.
B.

Presidential Assertions of Executive Privilege Shortly After
Independence Foreshadow the Modern Doctrine of a Qualified
Executive Privilege

Building on English and colonial precedent,36 early instances of postindependence presidential withholdings demonstrate this tension
between privilege and accountability. During the nation’s first executive
administration, President George Washington withheld executive
communications from Congress.37 President Washington’s firm belief in
an executive power to withhold communications to protect the public
interest38 was never challenged by Congress or in court.39 Rather, the
first serious challenge to a President’s withholding came during the 1807
treason trial of Aaron Burr.40
31. See sources cited supra note 30. President Jefferson, in both his and President Washington’s
administrations, cites the Walpole incident as support for the President’s privilege to withhold
certain communications, whether interpreted correctly or not. See sources cited supra note 30.
32. See sources cited supra note 30.
33. BERGER, supra note 28, at 32–33 (recounting assembly investigations into Crown officials by
the Massachusetts House of Commons and the Pennsylvania Assembly).
34. Id. at 31–32.
35. Id. at 31–33.
36. See supra notes 30–31.
37. See generally Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Privilege: An Historical Note, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1318 (1975).
38. John C. Yoo, George Washington and the Executive Power, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 34 (2010).
39. Sofaer, supra note 37, at 1318.
40. John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential
Power, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1435, 1437 (1999); see also United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
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Through subpoena, Burr’s counsel demanded that President Jefferson
turn over a letter he received from General James Wilkinson.41 The
President objected, asserting a privilege to withhold the letter as a
private communication whose release could endanger national security.42
Chief Justice Marshall, sitting in circuit, issued the subpoena
nonetheless, but noted that content irrelevant to the trial and harmful to
the public would be suppressed.43 In dicta in a later opinion, the Chief
Justice qualified his position and noted that “although subject to the
general rules which apply to others, [the President] may have sufficient
motives for declining to produce a particular paper, and those motives
may be such as to restrain the court from enforcing its production.”44 At
least one scholar asserts that every President has claimed some type of
exclusively presidential privilege.45
C.

Federal Courts Presume Presidential Communications Are
Privileged Unless the Requestor Demonstrates a Particularized
Need that Outweighs the Value of the Privilege in the Specific Case

While these historical incidents of executive privilege and Justice
Marshall’s dicta both fall short of establishing a constitutional principle,
the U.S. Supreme Court firmly established the modern doctrine of
qualified executive privilege in United States v. Nixon.46 In Nixon, the
Court first reasoned that a well-functioning executive branch requires
that some executive communications be kept private. The Court
famously stated: “Human experience teaches that those who expect
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a
concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of
the decisionmaking process.”47 The Court, however, did not limit its

41. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 30–31 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 37.
44. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
45. Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83
MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1999).
46. 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). The D.C. Circuit first addressed President Nixon’s claim of
privilege in Nixon v. Cirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). However, President Nixon did not
appeal that court’s order to disclose nine specific tapes for in camera review. In re Sealed Case, 121
F.3d 729, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
47. 418 U.S. at 705 (noting that the 1787 Constitutional Convention was conducted completely in
private and that all meeting records were sealed for 30 years after the Convention). The first
Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox, grounded this line of reasoning in two rationales: “(1)
to encourage aides and colleagues to give completely candid advice by reducing the risk that they
will be subject to public disclosure, criticism and reprisals; (2) to give the President or other officer
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reasoning to this functional rationale alone. For the first time, the Court
grounded the functional need for unencumbered presidential
decisionmaking in constitutional separation of powers.48 The Court did
not discuss the common law deliberative process privilege. Instead, it
held that the separation of powers doctrine, derived from the
Constitution’s structure, requires a sphere of privilege to ensure “the
effective discharge of a President’s powers” through uncompromised
internal deliberations.49
After firmly grounding executive privilege in constitutional doctrine,
the Court established a three-part test to analyze claims of privilege.
First, a President must formally assert executive privilege to withhold
certain communications and specify why their release would hamper the
President’s ability to fulfill constitutional duties.50 After this initial
showing, the Court will presume that the privilege applies.51 The Court
justified this presumption as “necess[ary] for protection of the public
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decisionmaking,” which presidential advisors “would be
unwilling to express except privately.”52 Under this analysis,
confidential executive decisionmaking is necessary for the executive
branch to carry out its constitutional duties, and the separation of powers
doctrine operates to shield those communications.53
Second, after a President asserts executive privilege to withhold
specific communications, the party seeking access must overcome the
presumed privilege by demonstrating particularized need.54 In Nixon, the
special prosecutor demonstrated particularized need by showing that
certain presidential tapes were necessary evidence in a criminal
conspiracy prosecution.55 The Court accepted this basis for compelled
disclosure on the ground that “our historic commitment to the rule of
law” in the American adversarial system requires the development of
facts through evidence.56 Furthermore, although the Constitution57 and
the freedom ‘to think out loud,’ which enables him to test ideas and debate policy and personalities
uninhibited by the danger that his tentative but rejected thoughts will become subjects of public
discussion.” Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1410 (1974).
48. See Cox supra note 47, at 1408–09.
49. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708, 711.
50. Id. at 713.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 708.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 708, 713–14.
55. Id. at 687–90.
56. Id. at 708–09.
57. Id. at 709 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
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common law58 both recognize certain evidentiary privileges, these
exceptions “are not lightly created nor expansively construed” because
they impede the search for truth.59
Finally, once an assertion of privilege is rebutted, the court inquires
whether the demonstrated need for disclosure actually outweighs the
value of the privilege in the context of the circumstances at hand.60
Generally, a court will review the contested documents in camera and
redact irrelevant material prior to release.61 Absent military, diplomatic,
or national security secrets, district court in camera review sufficiently
protects presidential communications.62
Applying this balancing test in Nixon, the Court considered the nature
and importance of the requested communications and whether the
specific disclosure would temper the candor of presidential advisors.63
The Court contrasted the President’s broadly asserted need for
confidentiality with the special prosecutor’s narrowly articulated need
for evidence in a criminal proceeding.64 Here, both considerations
weighed against the President. The Court reasoned that “infrequent
occasions of disclosure” in the context of criminal prosecutions are
unlikely to temper advisor candor.65 In contrast, it determined that “to
withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would
cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair

58. Id. (citing attorney and clergy communication privileges).
59. Id. at 710.
60. Id. at 711–13.
61. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
62. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706. Presumably, important foreign affairs documents
may preclude even in camera inspection.
63. Id. at 712.
64. Id. at 712–13. To note, the Court expressly limited its holding to criminal proceedings: “We
are not here concerned with the balance between the President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that between the
confidentiality interest and congressional demands for information, nor with the President’s interest
in preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict between the President’s assertion of a
generalized privilege of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant evidence in criminal
trials.” Id. at 712 n.19. But see Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (refusing to enforce a Senate Committee subpoena investigating
illegal activities during the 1972 presidential election because the committee failed to show that the
tapes were “critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee’s functions”); Sun Oil Co. v.
United States, 514 F.2d 1020, 1024 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (holding evidentiary demands in a civil
proceeding may be sufficient to overcome a claim of executive privilege, but noting “the burden on
the litigant seeking discovery might be heavier”); accord Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 247
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
65. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712.

Marchisio - FINAL-with corrected into quote.docx (Do Not Delete)

822

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/26/2012 6:15 PM

[Vol. 87:813

the basic function of the courts.”66
Following United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court acknowledged
in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services67 that a former President
may claim executive privilege for communications exchanged during a
previous administration.68 However, the Court held that General
Services’ restriction on public access would be sufficient to preserve
presidential confidentiality, rendering the privilege unnecessary.69 Thus,
while the Court recognizes a qualified executive privilege grounded in
constitutional separation of powers, it has yet to indicate where that
privilege exists outside the criminal context.70 Moreover, the Court has
yet to indicate whether any concerns besides critical national security
interests could overcome the need for disclosure in a criminal
proceeding.
D.

Executive Privilege Applies to Non-Presidential Communications
and May Be Broader in the Context of Civil Discovery

After the Nixon line of cases, lower federal courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court have tended to expand the presidential communications
privilege.71 In In re Sealed Case,72 the D.C. Circuit extended the
privilege to communications that do not involve the President but occur
between the President’s advisors “in conjunction with the process of
advising the President” in matters requiring direct presidential
decisionmaking.73 The case is important because it clearly distinguishes
between the executive privilege outlined in Nixon and the common law
deliberative process privilege applicable to Freedom of Information Act
requests.74 Importantly, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that “unlike the
deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege
applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-

66. Id.
67. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
68. Id. at 448–49.
69. Id. at 450.
70. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 359 (3d ed.
2006).
71. But see Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1112, 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (limiting executive privilege coverage of agency documents to those solicited by the Office of
the President). Importantly, the functional rationale of encouraging advisor candor is not implicated
in situations where the advice is unsolicited. Id. at 1116–17.
72. 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
73. Id. at 752.
74. Id. at 745–46.
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decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones.”75
Next, in Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,76
the U.S. Supreme Court declined to apply Nixon mechanically in the
civil discovery context.77 In contrast with the criminal discovery order in
Nixon, the Court held that Vice President Richard B. Cheney need not
formally assert executive privilege to withhold documents from a civil
discovery request and invite a separation of powers balancing inquiry.78
The Court suggested that the federal district court could have narrowed
the overly broad civil discovery requests at issue before requiring the
Vice President to formally assert the privilege and justify each
withholding with specificity.79 Federal courts should first consider
whether issuing a civil discovery order would constitute unwarranted
impairment of another branch’s performance of its constitutional
duties.80 The unchecked civil discovery orders here (“everything under
the sky”81) were too burdensome compared to Nixon, where the Court
required the special prosecutor to show the propriety of his requests.82
While the Cheney Court did not hold that a civil discovery request
could never result in compelled disclosure, it did suggest that the Vice
President (and President) may deny overly broad discovery requests
without first invoking executive privilege.83 Furthermore, the Court
clearly noted the distinction between civil and criminal cases, stating,
“[t]he need for information for use in civil cases, while far from
negligible, does not share the urgency or significance of the criminal

75. Id. at 745.
76. 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
77. Id. at 383–86.
78. Id. at 389–90.
79. Id. at 390.
80. See id. at 385.
81. Id. at 387.
82. Id. at 388.
83. Id. at 389–90. Other presidential withholdings from Congress may be interesting, but are less
instructive due to political resolution of the underlying disputes. MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30319, PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW,
PRACTICE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1, 9–16, 24–27, 29–31 (2007); State ex rel. Dann v. Taft
(Dann I), 848 N.E.2d 472, 479 n.1 (Ohio 2006) (“President Franklin D. Roosevelt refused to give
Congress FBI investigative files, President Eisenhower invoked executive privilege on over 30
occasions, and President Kennedy cited the privilege to prevent congressional oversight of foreign
policy.”) (citing Benjamin J. Priester et al., The Independent Counsel Statute: A Legal History, 62
WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 79 (1999); Roberto Iraola, Congressional Oversight, Executive
Privilege, and Requests for Information Relating to Federal Criminal Investigations and
Prosecutions, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1559, 1570 (2002)).
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subpoena requests in Nixon.”84
II.

STATES GENERALLY ADOPT THE SUBSTANTIVE
RATIONALES AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FROM
UNITED STATES V. NIXON

Almost all states that have grappled with executive privilege
recognize some form of gubernatorial privilege grounded in state
separation of powers.85 Generally, states tend to emulate the separation
of powers rationale and three-step analysis outlined in United States v.
Nixon even if some construe the scope of the privilege more narrowly
than the federal analogue. Additionally, two states have analyzed
executive privilege claims outside the gubernatorial context. New
Mexico applied the privilege to the state’s independently elected
attorney general,86 and Massachusetts broadly rejected the doctrine after
an appointed cabinet member asserted the privilege.87
A.

Most States Ground Executive Privilege in Constitutional
Separation of Powers and Construe the Privilege Broadly in the
Context of Civil Litigation

After Nixon, New Jersey was the first state to recognize a
gubernatorial analogue to the federal executive privilege doctrine.88 In
Nero v. Hyland,89 Governor Brendan Byrne indicated at a press
84. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 384.
85. See, e.g., Doe v. Alaska Super. Ct., Third Jud. Dist., 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska 1986); Guy v.
Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 659 A.2d 777, 782 (Del. Super. 1995); Hamilton v. Verdow, 414
A.2d 914 (Md. 1980); Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472; Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1978); State ex
rel. Att’y Gen. v. First Jud. Dist. Ct. of N.M., 629 P.2d 330 (N.M. 1981); accord Republican Party
of N.M. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t., No. 32,524, 2012 WL 2928471, at *11 (N.M. 2012);
Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, 572 A.2d 1368 (Vt. 1990). Massachusetts is alone in broadly rejecting
executive privilege. Babets v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Human Servs., 526 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass.
1988) (considering the privilege as asserted by an appointed cabinet member).
86. First Jud. Dist. Ct. of N.M., 629 P.2d 330; accord Republican Party of N.M., 2012 WL
2928471, at *11.
87. Babets, 526 N.E.2d 1261.
88. Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1978). Prior to Nixon, the Arizona Supreme Court
recognized its governor’s presumptive right to deny inspection of documents, but suggested trial
court in camera inspection would necessarily follow any assertion of such privilege in order to
determine whether disclosure “would be detrimental to the best interests of the state.” Mathews v.
Pyle, 251 P.2d 893, 896–97 (Ariz. 1952). Prior to Mathews, most state litigation over gubernatorial
withholdings centered on mandamus actions. See David R. Petrarca, Jr., Notes and Comments, A
Small Illegitimate Power: Executive Privilege in Rhode Island, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
659, 665 n.48 (2008) (citing Daniel Farber, Comment, Executive Privilege at the State Level, 1974
U. Ill. L.F. 631, 633 & n.20 (1974); R. E. Heinselman, Annotation, Mandumus to Governor, 105
A.L.R. 1124 (1936)).
89. 386 A.2d 846.
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conference that he declined to appoint John Nero to the New Jersey
Lottery Commission because of information revealed in a state police
background report.90 Seeking to defend his reputation, Mr. Nero filed a
public records request for that background report.91 The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the report fell outside the statutory definition of
“public records” subject to mandatory disclosure under New Jersey’s
Right to Know Law.92 The Court then held the request could not satisfy
a separate balancing test under the state’s common law access to public
documents rule and also failed under a newly adopted executive
privilege balancing test.93 With respect to gubernatorial privilege, the
Court largely adopted the rationales set forth in Nixon.94 The Court
reasoned that preventing the chilling effect disclosure would have on
informers in pre-appointment screening investigations was “far more
compelling” than the need to protect an already public figure from
potential unjust public censure.95 Importantly, the Court concluded that
“[a] vital public interest is clearly involved in the effectiveness of the
decisionmaking and investigatory duties of the executive.”96 Noting that
the state’s constitution provides for a strong executive, the Court held
that these gubernatorial functions implicate constitutional duties.97 Thus,
robust pre-appointment screening investigations and advisor candor
concerning recommendations arising from those investigations merited
executive privilege.98
The Alaska Supreme Court followed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Doe v. Alaska Superior Court99 under similar
circumstances.100 An unsuccessful applicant for gubernatorial
appointment to the State Medical Board brought a defamation suit
against a citizen group after the Alaska Governor’s Office announced
her appointment but later rescinded it.101 During discovery, the applicant

90. Id. at 848.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 850 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A–2 (repealed 2002) (current version at N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 47:1A–5) (2003)).
93. Id. at 851–53.
94. Id. at 853 (citing Nixon and federal separation of powers).
95. Id. at 853.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska 1986).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 619.
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requested the governor’s appointment file, which included letters from
the public opposing her appointment.102 Citing Nixon and Nero, the
Alaska Supreme Court held the state’s separation of powers doctrine
entitled the governor to a qualified executive privilege to withhold
certain communications.103 That privilege did not extend, however, to
the unsolicited letters from the general public contained in the
appointment file.104 Rather, the underlying rationales articulated in
Nixon—promoting candid advice from aids and creative internal
deliberations—only demanded protection of internal communications.105
Similar to Nero and Alaska Superior Court, in Hamilton v. Verdow106
the Maryland Court of Appeals analyzed gubernatorial privilege in a
civil proceeding.107 During discovery, the plaintiff requested a
confidential report prepared for the governor concerning a patient
released from a state mental health facility.108 The Maryland Court
began its analysis by analogizing its governor to the President: “[T]he
Governor bears the same relation to this State as does the President to
the United States” and is generally “entitled to the same privileges and
exemptions in the discharge of his duties as is the President.”109 The
Court then recognized a qualified executive privilege grounded in both
the functional and separation of powers rationales set forth in Nixon.110
Regardless of the nature of the parties in an underlying dispute, the
separation of powers doctrine “place[s] limits on a court’s power to
review or interfere with the conclusions, acts or decisions of a coordinate
branch of government made within its own sphere of authority.”111 In
applying this reasoning, the Court instructed the district court to
determine whether the report consisted of mostly factual material, not
entitled to a presumptive privilege, and subject to in camera
102. Id.
103. Id. at 623.
104. Id. at 624–25.
105. Id. (adopting Professor Cox’s articulation of the rationales in Nixon, see Cox, supra note
47). The Alaska Supreme Court later narrowed the privilege to materials that are both deliberative
and pre-decisional, adopting something closer to the deliberative process privilege. Capital Info.
Group v. State, 923 P.2d 29, 33–36 (Alaska 1996). However, Alaska’s executive privilege doctrine
is still rooted in state separation of powers. Id. at 35.
106. 414 A.2d 914 (Md. 1980).
107. Id. at 917.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 921.
110. Id. at 920–24 (citing the Burr incident relied on in Nixon, United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
30, 37–38 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d); the functional rationales identified by Professor Cox, see
Cox, supra note 47; and Nixon’s grounding the privilege in separation of powers, United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)).
111. Id. at 921.
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inspection.112
Most recently, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized a qualified
executive privilege protecting gubernatorial communications.113 A
public records request under the state’s Public Records Act provided the
backdrop.114 State Senator Marc Dann requested several “short topical”
weekly reports prepared for Governor Bob Taft by the Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation Administrator.115 In a mandamus action before
the Ohio Supreme Court, Governor Taft claimed an executive privilege
analogous to Nixon116 to withhold over 200 reports spanning a six-year
period.117 The Court recognized a qualified executive privilege, citing
the functional rationales in several federal118 and state supreme court119
opinions. Unlike any other state supreme court, however, the Court
analyzed its state’s own constitutional history to determine whether the
state constitution supported the privilege.120
The Ohio Supreme Court first acknowledged the legislature’s primacy
over the judicial and executive branches in Ohio’s 1802 Constitution.121
It found, however, that “over the years, various constitutional
amendments increased the power of the executive branch to achieve a
rough equality with the other branches.”122 The Court then outlined the
development of its separation of powers doctrine in light of the state’s
now “three coequal branches.”123 It held executive privilege to be
consistent with its separation of powers doctrine.124 It reasoned that the
public interest is best served by preserving the “quality of
112. Id. at 928.
113. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 2006).
114. Id. at 475.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 480.
117. Id. at 477.
118. Id. at 480–81 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004); In re
Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
119. Id. at 482 (citing Doe v. Alaska Super. Ct., Third Jud. Dist., 721 P.2d 617, 623 (Alaska
1986); Mathews v. Pyle, 521 P.2d 893, 896–97 (Ariz. 1952); Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm’n,
659 A.2d 777, 783 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995); Hamilton v. Verdow, 414 A.2d 914, 921 (Md. 1980);
Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J. 1978); New England Coal. for Energy Efficiency & Env’t
v. Office of Governor, 670 A.2d 815, 817–18 (Vt. 1995); Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, 572 A.2d 1368,
1373–74 (Vt. 1990)).
120. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 483.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 484.
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decisionmaking by the highest executive officer of Ohio government,”
which requires “unhampered” advisor candor.125 Finally, the Court
acknowledged that the state’s Public Records Act does not require a
requestor to demonstrate particular need126 and that the Act is construed
liberally in favor of broad access.127 Yet, the reports were gubernatorialprivileged and therefore not “public records” under the Act.128
B.

Vermont and Delaware Ground Executive Privilege in Both
Common Law and Constitutional Doctrines

In Killington, Ltd. v. Lash,129 the Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources claimed executive privilege over its communications directly
to or from the Vermont Governor’s Office.130 The Vermont Access to
Public Records law establishes a citizen right to access government
information without a particular showing of need.131 However, the
statute also codifies common law privileges, both in substance and
procedure, as specific exemptions to disclosure.132 The Agency argued
that executive privilege was among the common law exemptions
recognized in the public records statute.133 The Vermont Supreme Court
agreed and held that executive privilege, as a common law privilege,
constitutes such an exception.134 Because the statute also adopts the
procedures for each privilege created at common law, the privilege here
shifted the presumption from disclosure under the Access to Public
Records statute to a presumption of privilege under the executive
privilege doctrine.135 The Court specifically noted the doctrine’s
constitutional and common law roots, emphasizing that pre-Nixon
precedent regarded the privilege as part of the common law of
evidence.136 Indeed, the Court reaffirmed the privilege’s common law
roots in New England Coalition for Efficiency & the Environment v.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 486.
127. Id. at 477.
128. Id. at 487; see OHIO REV. CODE § 149.43(A)(1)(v) (excluding from the definition of “public
records” those “[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law”).
129. 572 A.2d 1368 (Vt. 1990).
130. Id. at 1370–71.
131. Id. at 1375 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 315, 319(a)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1370–71.
134. Id. at 1375.
135. Id.; accord New England Coal. for Energy Efficiency & Env’t v. Office of Governor, 670
A.2d 815, 817 (Vt. 1995).
136. Killington, 572 A.2d at 1373–74.
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Office of the Governor.137 In addition to the privilege’s strong common
law roots, the Court broadly construed the privilege’s scope to include
post-decisional documents.138 The unique nature of gubernatorial
decisionmaking justified this expansion:
The decision-making process of the chief executive is not
prescribed by statute, nor does it consist of regularized
procedures. The public does not have the same interest in
examining the internal workings of the process. Moreover,
because the chief executive has a range of consultative and
decisional responsibilities not easily separated into discrete
decisions, predecision and postdecision line-drawing would be
an arbitrary exercise.139
Thus, although the Vermont Supreme Court grounds executive
privilege in common law roots, it expressly recognizes the constitutional
magnitude of chief executive decisionmaking.140
Similarly, a Delaware Superior Court determined that both
constitutional separation of powers and the common law of evidence
supported an executive privilege doctrine.141 Using the Delaware
Freedom of Information Act, a plaintiff sought access to records from
the governor’s Judicial Nominating Commission concerning prospective
nominees to fill a Delaware Supreme Court vacancy.142 Under the
statute, some documents are “specifically exempted from public
disclosure by statute or common law.”143 The court determined that the
constitutional and common law roots of executive privilege were
sufficient to trigger this statutory exemption.144 Like the Court in
Killington, the Delaware court held that a state Freedom of Information
Act request alone does not supply a particularized need to rebut a
presumed executive privilege, per se.145 In other words, because the Act
incorporates common law exemptions to disclosure, a request is not
independently sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of executive

137. 670 A.2d 815.
138. Id. at 817.
139. Id. at 818.
140. Id. at 820.
141. Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 659 A.2d 777, 782 (Del. Super. 1995).
142. Id. at 779.
143. Id. at 782–83 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(d)(6) (current version at DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(g)(6) (2003))).
144. Id. at 782–83.
145. Id. at 785.
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privilege. Executive privilege constitutes a common law exemption.146
Therefore, it would be incongruous to use the Act’s presumption in favor
of disclosure to rebut an exemption to the Act itself.147
Although the Vermont and Delaware courts draw heavily on the
common law to support an executive privilege, both also rely on
constitutional separation of powers. This reliance indicates that both
Vermont and Delaware may serve as persuasive precedent for other
states in adopting executive privilege grounded in constitutional
separation of powers.
C.

New Mexico and Massachusetts Have Reached Divergent
Conclusions Regarding Non-Gubernatorial Application of
Executive Privilege

The New Mexico Supreme Court extended executive privilege to the
state’s attorney general148 in State v. First Judicial District Court of New
Mexico.149 Through civil discovery, plaintiffs sought investigatory
material compiled by the state’s attorney general concerning a state
penitentiary riot.150 The Court held that the state’s constitution, and not
the state’s rules of evidence or supreme court rules, required application
of executive privilege.151 After noting the state constitution’s specific
separation of powers provision, the Court outlined the familiar
decisionmaking protection rationales for the privilege articulated in
Nixon.152 The Court summarily concluded that, as a member of the
executive department under the state’s constitution, the attorney general
holds the privilege.153 Finally, the Court adopted a burden shifting
analysis and balancing test closely analogous to Nixon’s to determine
whether the privilege applies in a specific case.154 With little analysis,
the Court held “[t]he material obtained by the Attorney General from
corrections officers and other executive department personnel is
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. New Mexico’s attorney general is popularly elected, separate from the state’s governor.
N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1.
149. 629 P.2d 330 (N.M. 1981). In a recent opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to
extend the privilege to an appointed cabinet member seeking to withhold communications that did
not contain policy recommendations to the governor or otherwise evidence gubernatorial
deliberations. Republican Party of N.M. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t., No. 32,524, 2012 WL
2928471, at *17 (N.M. 2012).
150. First Jud. Dist. Ct. of N.M., 629 P.2d at 332.
151. Id. at 333.
152. Id. at 333–34.
153. Id. at 334 (citing N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1).
154. Id.
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protected by the executive privilege.”155
Similarly, in Babets v. Secretary of Executive Office of Human
Services,156 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered
executive privilege in the context of non-gubernatorial
communications.157 Plaintiffs requested documents relating to policy
development in a challenge to a specific Department of Social Services
rulemaking.158 The secretary produced some requested documents, but
refused to produce others, claiming a “governmental privilege.”159 The
trial judge refused to recognize the privilege in the absence of
Massachusetts precedent.160 Instead, the judge referred the matter for
direct appellate review,161 making “certain findings and rulings” that the
documents would be privileged under a federal deliberative process
privilege framework.162
After granting direct review,163 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court broadly rejected both the secretary’s privilege claim and the
doctrine’s roots in the Massachusetts Constitution.164 The constitution’s
text includes a legislative privilege, but excludes a similar executive
privilege.165 The Court found it “reasonable to expect that [the
constitution’s framers] would expressly have created one” had they so
desired.166 The Court also refused to create an executive privilege under
the common law and rejected the secretary’s functional arguments out of
hand.167 Here, the Court cited its own “customary reluctance . . . to
create common law privileges to exclude relevant evidence” and a
preference to leave privilege law to the legislature.168
155. Id.
156. 526 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1988).
157. Id. at 1262.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1262–63.
160. Id. at 1263.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1263 n.5.
163. Id. at 1262.
164. Id. at 1263.
165. Id. (citing the Massachusetts speech and debate clause, MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXI).
166. Id. at 1263.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1264. Despite the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s close reading of the
Massachusetts Constitution and deference to the state’s legislative body, its reason for rejecting the
secretary’s claim, even had it adopted federal precedent, is not entirely persuasive. Id. (citing Nixon
v. Adm’r of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 435, 445 (1997)). The federal precedent cited, Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, recognized that a federal statute requiring storage of executive
materials in a federal agency did not violate executive privilege, in part because the privilege could
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States Generally Apply Nixon’s Three-Part Framework for
Analyzing Executive Privilege Claims

States have borrowed more than Nixon’s separation of powers
rationale; they have also adopted its three-part framework for analyzing
executive privilege claims. Importantly, executive privilege analysis
starts with a presumption in favor of privilege even when state public
records statutes do not require a showing of need by the requesting
party.169 This is because communications covered by executive privilege
are exempt by statute from public records laws.170 To determine whether
a specific executive communication is in fact exempt, state courts use
the three-step analysis under Nixon, beginning with the presumptive
privilege.
Under the Nixon framework, in response to a discovery or public
records request, a court must first review a governor’s171 formal
assertion of privilege.172 In a privilege log or affidavit, the governor’s
later be asserted to protect those communications from public dissemination. 433 U.S. at 444. “The
Executive Branch remains in full control of the Presidential materials, and the Act facially is
designed to ensure that the materials can be released only when release is not barred by some
applicable privilege inherent in that branch.” Id. It is not apparent how this precedent provides
support for a federal rule of unrestricted disclosure of executive documents in civil discovery.
169. See, e.g., Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 659 A.2d 777, 782 (Del. Super. 1995)
(exempting from the “public record” definition “[a]ny records specifically exempted from public
disclosure by statute or common law”) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(d)(6) (current
version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(g)(6) (2003))); Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472, 492 (Ohio
2006) (excluding from the definition of “public records” those “[r]ecords the release of which is
prohibited by state or federal law” (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 149.43(A)(1)(v))); Killington, Ltd. v.
Lash, 572 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Vt. 1990) (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(b)(4) (current version at
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 317(c)(4) (2010))). Vermont exempts from “public inspection and
copying . . . records which, if made public pursuant to this subchapter, would cause the custodian to
violate any statutory or common law privilege other than the common law deliberative process
privilege as it applies to the general assembly and the executive branch agencies of the state of
Vermont.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(c)(4) (2012). But cf. Republican Party of N.M. v. N.M.
Taxation & Revenue Dep’t., No. 32,524, 2012 WL 2928471, at *16 (N.M. 2012) (“Unlike a party
seeking discovery in civil litigation, a party requesting public records under [the Inspection of
Public Records Act] need not assert any particular need for disclosure . . . . [The] instruction that
courts should balance the competing needs of the executive and the party seeking disclosure,
therefore, does not apply to claims of executive privilege under IPRA. Instead, courts considering
the application of executive privilege to an IPRA request must independently determine whether the
documents at issue are in fact covered by the privilege, and whether the privilege was invoked by
the Governor, to whom the privilege is reserved.”) (citation omitted).
170. See sources cited supra note 169.
171. Recall that New Mexico extends the privilege to the state’s attorney general, an executive
department official named in the state’s constitution. State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.
of N.M., 629 P.2d 330, 334 (N.M. 1981) (citing N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1); accord Republican Party
of N.M., 2012 WL 2928471, at *11 (N.M. 2012).
172. Doe v. Alaska Sup. Ct., Third Jud. Dist., 721 P.2d 617, 626 (Alaska 1986); First Jud. Dist.
Ct. of N.M., 629 P.2d at 334; Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 485–86; Killington, 572 A.2d at 1376.
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office must identify the records being withheld and justify the privilege
for each withholding.173 To establish a prima facie claim of privilege, the
governor need only assert that the communications “were made for the
purpose of fostering informed and sound gubernatorial deliberations,
policymaking, and decisionmaking.”174 Absent this showing, a court will
not recognize the privilege.175 In camera review at this stage is
inappropriate if the governor’s justifications establish a prima facie
privilege.176 Indeed, in camera inspection would undermine the
functional and separation of powers rationales underlying the initial
presumption in favor of privilege.177
Second, after a governor establishes a prima facie privilege to
withhold certain communications, the requestor must overcome this
presumption.178 Requestors can overcome the presumptive privilege only
if they demonstrate particularized need for the specific
communications.179 Absent a showing of particularized need, the
privilege holds, and the communications are shielded even from in
camera review.180 Generally, requests in criminal proceedings and
requests implicating individual legal rights in civil litigation can rebut a
governor’s presumptive privilege.181
Finally, if a requestor demonstrates particularized need sufficient to
outweigh a governor’s presumptive privilege, then a reviewing court will
balance the relative interests at stake.182 On one side are the collective
public interest in robust and unhampered executive decisionmaking and
the degree to which release of the communications at issue will
173. See sources cited supra note 172.
174. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 485–86.
175. See id. at 487.
176. Alaska Sup. Ct., 721 P.2d at 626; Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 659 A.2d 777, 785
(Del. Super. Ct. 1995); Hamilton v. Verdow, 414 A.2d 914, 926–27 (Md. 1980); Killington, 572
A.2d at 1375.
177. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974); Killington, 572 A.2d at 1376 (“Where
those documents directly involve the governor, even an in camera inspection might materially and
irrevocably compromise the fundamental interests of the executive branch of government.”). In
camera inspection ordered by one branch of government against another necessarily implicates
separation of powers concerns.
178. Alaska Sup. Ct., 721 P.2d at 626; Guy, 659 A.2d at 785; Hamilton, 414 A.2d at 926; State ex
rel. Att’y Gen. v. First Jud. Dist. Ct. of N.M., 629 P.2d 330, 334 (N.M. 1981); Dann I, 848 N.E.2d
at 485–86; Killington, 572 A.2d at 1375.
179. See sources cited supra note 178.
180. See sources cited supra note 178.
181. See infra notes 191–96 and accompanying text.
182. Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J. 1978); First Jud. Dist. Ct. of N.M., 629 P.2d at
334; Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 485.
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undermine this interest.183 On the other side are the demonstrated
particularized need for those communications and the possibility that
withholding them would jeopardize other constitutional mandates184 or
deprive a litigant of the sole means of obtaining badly needed
information.185 Here, in camera review to balance requestor and public
interests is appropriate,186 and a court may uphold or reject a
gubernatorial claim of privilege, in whole or in part.187
E.

State Courts Collectively Identify Three Categories of Claimed
Requestor Need: Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, Evidence in
Certain Civil Litigation, and General Inquiry into Executive
Deliberations

While courts recognize a governor’s presumptive privilege over
gubernatorial communications with only modest justification,188 courts
honor that presumption.189 To overcome the presumption, a requestor’s
need must be both demonstrated and particularized.190 Taken as a whole,
state courts have addressed three categories of need to overcome a
governor’s presumptive privilege. First, following Nixon, state courts
have noted in dicta that in criminal cases, “the very integrity of the
judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full
disclosure of all the facts.”191 On its face, courts likely will always
183. See, e.g., Alaska Sup. Ct., 721 P.2d at 626; Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 485–87; Hamilton, 414
A.2d at 924–26; Nero, 386 A.2d at 853.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (“The right to the production of
all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment
explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right ‘to be confronted with the
witnesses against him’ and ‘to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without
due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to
accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.”).
185. For example, the “possible unjust censure of a candidate for appointment . . . who is already
a public figure whose character and personal attributes are already the subject of legitimate public
interest” did not outweigh the public interest in “effective pre-appointment screening of prospective
appointees” by the governor. Nero, 386 A.2d at 853.
186. Doe v. Alaska Sup. Ct., Third Jud. Dist., 721 P.2d 617, 626 (Alaska 1986); Hamilton v.
Verdow, 414 A.2d 914, 927 (Md. 1980).
187. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 486.
188. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
189. Hamilton, 414 A.2d at 926 (“[W]here the material sought from the government consists
wholly of confidential opinions, deliberations and recommendations for use in civil litigation where
the government is not a party, and where there is no charge of misconduct involving the government
agency from which production is sought, the material is clearly privileged.”).
190. See sources cited supra note 178.
191. Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 659 A.2d 777, 785 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995) (quoting
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709); Hamilton, 414 A.2d at 925.
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recognize that the Constitution’s evidentiary requirements for criminal
prosecutions are sufficient to rebut an initial presumptive privilege.192
Second, requestors with authority to investigate civil matters, like
legislative committees or grand juries, may demonstrate particularized
need.193 State courts have also noted in dicta that the need for evidence
in civil cases alleging government misconduct might rebut an initial
presumption of privilege.194 This is also true any time the government is
party to the underlying litigation.195 For example, a taxpayer who alleges
governmental misconduct surrounding a government account in which
she has a specific pecuniary interest may trigger in camera inspection of
potentially responsive records.196
Thus, in civil litigation contexts, state courts treat their governors with
less deference than the U.S. Supreme Court treats the President.197 This
difference reflects the fact that state governors have fewer inherent
powers, if any, than the President.198 Furthermore, even in states with
strong executives, their governors have limited, if any, corresponding
foreign affairs responsibilities as compared to the President.199
Finally, despite this power difference, state courts have been reluctant
to recognize general state policies favoring transparency in government
as a third category sufficient to rebut presumptive gubernatorial
192. See supra note 184.
193. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472, 486 (Ohio 2006).
194. Hamilton, 414 A.2d at 925; Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, 572 A.2d 1368, 1374 (Vt. 1990).
195. Hamilton, 414 A.2d at 925, n.8 (“Where the government is a party, a question of unfair
litigation advantage may arise. In other words, the government may be in a position of asserting or
defending a claim while at the same time depriving its opponent of information needed to overcome
the government’s position. In these circumstances, courts have weighed the government’s need for
confidentiality against its opponent’s need for information. Of course, in this situation, a
determination by a court that the government’s need for confidentiality is outweighed by its
opponent’s need for disclosure, does not absolutely prevent the government from maintaining
confidentiality. The government is then left with the choice of either producing the information or
having the issue to which the information relates resolved against it. But where the government is
not a party to the underlying litigation, this choice is not open to it.” (citations omitted)).
196. State ex rel. Dann v. Taft (Dann II), 850 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ohio 2006). In contrast, an Ohio tax
payer “who paid taxes into the general fund and paid gasoline taxes” was unable to allege
particularized need on that basis alone for lack of standing. State ex rel. Dann v. Taft (Dann III),
853 N.E.2d 263, 266 (Ohio 2006).
197. See generally supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text.
198. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 304–06 (2009);
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 17–18 (1998).
199. Compare supra note 62 and accompanying text, with Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign
Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2384–98 (2006) (noting gubernatorial responsibilities include
responding to requests by foreign governments and international institutions, negotiating
international agreements in support of regional cooperation, and administering insurance regulations
and purchasing regulations to support foreign policy goals).
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privilege200 even in the face of strong state public records acts.201
Executive privileged communications are either excluded from the state
law’s definition of “public record”202 or exempt from disclosure
generally.203 In either case, a codified public policy favoring disclosure
in state public records acts is generally insufficient to rebut a governor’s
presumptive privilege.204 Thus, state courts have drawn a line between
(1) general legislative policies favoring public access to governmental
records and (2) a particular need to protect individual legal interests in
criminal or civil litigation, with the former interest characterized as
insufficient to overcome executive privilege.
III. WASHINGTON’S POPULIST ROOTS AND SEPARATION OF
POWERS DOCTRINE INFORM STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Although Washington incorporates pre-independence English
common law and Territorial common law through a reception statute,205
200. Wilson v. Brown, 962 A.2d 1122, 1136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (citing Nero v.
Hyland, 386 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1978)).
201. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 659 A.2d 777, 782 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995)
(exempting from the “public record” definition “[a]ny records specifically exempted from public
disclosure by statute or common law”) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(d)(6) (current
version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(g)(6) (2003))); Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472, 492 (Ohio
2006) (excluding from the definition of “public records” those “[r]ecords the release of which is
prohibited by state or federal law”) (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 149.43(A)(1)(v)).
203. See, e.g., Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, 572 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Vt. 1990) (citing VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 317(b)(4) (current version at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 317(c)(4) (2010))). Vermont exempts
from “public inspection and copying . . . records which, if made public pursuant to this subchapter,
would cause the custodian to violate any statutory or common law privilege other than the common
law deliberative process privilege as it applies to the general assembly and the executive branch
agencies of the state of Vermont.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(c)(4) (2010).
204. See, e.g., Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 486 (suggesting a higher bar for public request where “a
court may find a particularized need when disclosure is sought by a uniquely qualified
representative of the general public who demonstrates that disclosure of particular information to it
will serve the public interest”).
205. Washington’s constitution incorporates Territorial common law. WASH. CONST. art. XXVII,
§ 2 (“All laws now in force in the Territory of Washington, which are not repugnant to this
Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitation, or are altered or
repealed by the legislature . . . .”); In re Moore, 81 F. 356, 357 (C.C.E.D. Wash. 1897). English
common law survived through a Territorial reception statute that is still codified today. WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.04.010 (2012) (“The common law, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, or of the state of Washington nor incompatible with the institutions
and condition of society in this state, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state.”).
The Washington State Supreme Court interprets its reception statute as incorporating the “common
law of England, including the English statutes in force at the date of the Declaration of
Independence.” Cooper v. Runnels, 48 Wash. 2d 108, 112, 291 P.2d 657, 659 (1955) (citing WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.04.010); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 684–85, 126 P.2d 765, 771 (1942)).
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these precedents shed little light on executive privilege.206 By contrast,
the tension between Washington’s populist history and its established
separation of powers doctrine informs the debate over executive power.
Washington State’s populist roots, seeded throughout its Constitution207
and reaffirmed in robust citizen-driven public disclosure laws,208 caution
against expanding gubernatorial power with an executive privilege. Yet,
as with other states that have adopted executive privilege, Washington’s
constitution contemplates meaningful separation of powers.209 These
competing themes should guide Washington’s executive privilege
doctrine.
A.

Washington’s Constitution Contains Populist Checks Against
Government Corruption and Inaction

Washington’s constitution is more easily amended than the Federal
Constitution, suggesting its more “political” character is suited to reflect
current and evolving local values.210 State constitutions in general are
also credited as the “primary devices” for safeguarding individual
rights.211 The structure of Washington’s constitution, as embodying
these principles, indicates how Washington’s ratifying voters212 would
understand executive privilege.
Washington’s constitutional framework calls into question the extent
to which Washington’s ratifying voters would have ceded public
oversight of government to the very office holders they meant to
Therefore, English common law may provide persuasive authority when interpreting Washington
law. King v. King, 162 Wash. 2d 378, 393, 174 P.3d 659, 667 (2007) (examining English common
law prior to independence).
206. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Hugh D. Spitzer, The Past and Present Populist State, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 771, 772 (George E. Connor & Christopher W.
Hammons, eds., 2008) (“The public’s distrust of railroad, mining, and other corporations; concerns
about special-interest control of government; and general objection to the concentration of power in
elites led to a constitution that imposed numerous restrictions on the legislature, scattered executive
authority among independently elected officials, intentionally hamstrung corporations, and provided
strong protections of individual liberties.”).
208. See Initiative Measure No. 276, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1 (1972).
209. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
210. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 2 (2002).
211. Id. at 3 (citing William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977)); Spitzer, supra note 207, at 771, 777.
212. The Washington State Supreme Court specifically looks to the intent of “we the people”
who voted on ratification, rather than to the constitution’s drafters. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note
210, at 8 (citing State ex rel. Albright v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 2d 767, 395 P.2d 231 (1964)).
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constrain.213 Unlike the federal Constitutional Convention of 1787,214
debate during Washington’s Constitutional Convention was open.215
Records of the Convention debates reveal that by 1889 Washingtonians
possessed “bitter resentment” toward large corporations and the
railroads, which extorted land and subsidies from all levels of
government.216 Private corporations in Washington are subject to many
populist constitutional provisions restricting their activities.217 Today,
the Washington State Supreme Court still recognizes the state
constitution’s populist distaste for government and business
entanglement.218
Washington ratified certain “democratic checks” on state government
reflecting this populist sentiment.219 Washington’s constitution provides
for an elected judiciary,220 independently elected executive officers,221
voter control over state indebtedness,222 and local self-government
through municipal home rule.223 It prohibits most special legislation,224
and it requires that each bill contain only one subject that is also
reflected in its title.225 Washington’s voters ratified three additional
213. See, e.g., Brian Snure, Comment, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles:
Individual Rights, Free Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67 WASH. L. REV.
669, 671 (1992) (“Washington’s citizens feared governmental tyranny, a tyranny they generally
identified with the legislative branch.”).
214. See supra note 47.
215. See Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 2d 286, 292, 347 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1959); UTTER & SPITZER,
supra note 210, at 9.
216. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 210, at 11.
217. Id. at 181; Spitzer, supra note 207, at 771, 775–77.
218. See, e.g., Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass’n v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470, 487, 90 P.3d 42,
49–50 (2004) (holding that the qualifier “for the benefit of the state” in the state constitution’s
convict labor provision, WASH. CONST. art. II § 29, could not be construed to allow the state to
contract prison labor for the benefit of private industry).
219. Snure, supra note 213, at 677–78, 684–86; see also Spitzer, supra note 207, at 771, 781–84.
220. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
221. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 1.
222. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (amended 1972).
223. WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 4 (amended 1948), 10 (amended 1964).
224. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 28; WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 10–11.
225. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19. This provision keenly reflects the populist movement’s distrust
of government secrecy. Requiring that bills contain only one subject and that the subject is reflected
in the bill’s title accomplishes three recognized goals: “first to prevent hodge-podge or ‘logrolling’
legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills
of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in
order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall
so desire.” Petroleum Lease Properties Co. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 254, 259, 80 P.2d 774, 776 (1938)
(quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
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checks in 1912 by amending the constitution to include initiative,
referendum, and recall provisions.226 Furthermore, Washington voters
adopted a robust public records act and campaign disclosure regime by
initiative to the people.227 These key measures confirm Washington’s
persistent populism and continued effort to maintain citizen oversight of
government.
B.

The Washington State Supreme Court Recognizes a State
Separation of Powers Doctrine

Although the delegates to Washington’s second Constitutional
Convention rejected a discrete separation of powers clause,228 the
Washington State Supreme Court recognizes a separation of powers
principle analogous to federal doctrine.229 Three independent vesting
clauses divide the state’s political power among three familiar branches
of government: legislative, executive, and judicial.230 Washington’s
separation of powers doctrine preserves the constitutional integrity of
each branch by preventing one from invading another’s core sphere of

UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 296 (8th ed. 1927)).
226. WASH. CONST. amend. VII (art II, § 1), amend. VIII (art. I, §§ 33, 34).
227. Initiative Measure No. 276, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1 (1972); see WASH. REV. CODE ch.
42.17A (2012) (Campaign Disclosure and Contribution), WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.56 (2012)
(Public Records Act).
228. Compare W. LAIR HILL, WASHINGTON: A CONSTITUTION ADAPTED TO THE COMING STATE
30 (1889) (“The powers of the government of the state of Washington shall be divided into three
separate departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions
pertaining to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.”),
with Brown v. Owen, 165 Wash. 2d 706, 718, 206 P.3d 310, 316 (2009) (recognizing separation of
powers in the absence of a specific provision providing for it in Washington’s constitution), and
Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash. 2d 129, 134–35, 882 P.2d 173, 176–77 (1994) (noting the absence of a
specific separation of powers clause in both the federal and Washington constitutions). Hill’s draft
was distributed to Convention members as a model state constitution. Arthur S. Beardsley, The
Sources of the Washington Constitution as Found in the Constitutions of the Several States, in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 361 (Belle Reeves
ed., 1972).
229. Hale v. Wellpinit School Dist., 165 Wash. 2d 494, 506, 198 P.3d 1021, 1026–27 (2009); see
also Spitzer, supra note 207, at 771, 781–82.
230. Article II, section 1 vests the legislative authority in the legislature while reserving some
lawmaking powers in the people. Article III, section 1, creates the executive department, and article
III, section 2, vests the “supreme executive power” in the governor. Article IV, section 2, vests the
judicial power in “a supreme court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as
the legislature may provide.” See also 1 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3.2 (7th ed. 2011) (describing constitutional foundations of
separation of powers).
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competence.231 This principle prevents the legislature from enacting
rules that would “divest the executive of, or preclude his exercising, any
of his constitutional prerogatives or powers.”232
In the context of legislative encroachments into the judiciary, for
example, the legislature may not determine constitutional rules of
decision for Washington State Supreme Court judgments because the
Court’s duty to interpret the state constitution constitutes a core
competence.233 Similarly, Washington courts refuse to interfere with
rulings on points of order within legislative proceedings.234 On the other
hand, the legislature’s retroactive amendment to a statute previously
construed by the Court does not improperly encroach on the Court’s
fundamental function if the legislature takes special care to preserve the
Court’s prior judgment.235
The separation of powers doctrine, however, does not force the
branches to operate in strict silos.236 Rather, “because the three branches
are not ‘hermetically sealed,’” principles of “flexibility and practicality”
231. State v. Moreno, 147 Wash. 2d 500, 505–06, 58 P.3d 265, 268 (2002) (quoting Carrick, 125
Wash. 2d at 135, 882 P.2d at 177).
232. At length, Chief Justice Cooley, the influential Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice,
scholar, and dean of the University of Michigan Law School writes:
Whether in those cases where power is given by the constitution to the governor, the legislature
have the same authority to make rules for the exercise of the power, that they have to make
rules to govern the proceedings in the courts, may perhaps be a question. It would seem that
this must depend generally upon the nature of the power, and upon the question whether the
constitution, in conferring it, has furnished a sufficient rule for its exercise. Where complete
power to pardon is conferred upon the executive, it may be doubted if the legislature can
impose restrictions under the name of rules or regulations; but when the governor is made
commander-in-chief of the military forces of the State, his authority must be exercised under
such proper rules as the legislature may prescribe, because the military forces are themselves
under the control of the legislature, and military law is prescribed by that department. There
would be this clear limitation upon the power of the legislature to prescribe rules for the
executive department, that they must not be such as, under pretence of regulation, divest the
executive of, or preclude his exercising, any of his constitutional prerogatives or powers.
Those matters which the constitution specifically confides to him the legislature cannot directly
or indirectly take from his control. . . .
It may be proper to say here, that the executive, in proper discharge of his duties, under the
constitution, is as independent of the courts as he is of the legislature.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 137–38 (5th ed. 1883) (emphasis
added). Chief Justice Cooley’s constitutional scholarship, in print at the time of Washington’s
Constitutional Convention, is highly regarded by the Washington State Supreme Court.
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 274, 11 P.3d 762, 814 (2000),
opinion corrected, 27 P.3d 608 (Wash. 2001) (identifying Justice Cooley as a “renowned
constitutional scholar and treatise author relied upon at least 170 times by this court”).
233. Seattle Sch. Dist. of King Cnty. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 496, 585 P.2d 71, 83 (1978).
234. Brown v. Owen, 165 Wash. 2d 706, 722, 206 P.3d 310, 318 (2009).
235. Hale v. Wellpinit Sch. Dist. No. 49, 165 Wash. 2d 494, 509–10, 198 P.3d 1021, 1028–29
(2009); see also In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 452, 461–62, 832 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1992)
(outlining the curative amendment doctrine).
236. See Moreno, 147 Wash. 2d at 505, 58 P.3d at 268.
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allow some functional overlap.237 The concept of checks and balances
contemplates that one branch’s performance of its inherent functions
will often serve to check another’s.238 Under this framework, the Court
asks “not whether two branches of government engage in coinciding
activities, but rather whether the activity of one branch threatens the
independence or integrity or invades the prerogatives of another.”239 If
one branch’s activity undermines a second branch’s operation or the rule
of law, then it violates separation of powers principles.240
Under this test, the Court held that the judicial branch did not
“invade[] the prerogatives” of the executive branch when a district court
judge called and questioned a witness for the state in the absence of a
state prosecutor.241 Merely “asking for both parties’ evidence, listening
to all of it, and deciding whether an infraction was committed [kept the
district court] within the constitutional confines of the judicial power.”242
Similarly, the legislature did not encroach upon the judicial branch’s
inherent power over its own administration by permitting juvenile court
employees to collectively bargain over their salaries with their county
paymasters.243
Moreover, under Washington’s separation of powers doctrine,
members of one branch must meet a high standard of proof to compel
action by another branch. A governmental entity must assert through
“clear, cogent and convincing proof” that another branch’s failure to act
interferes with its exercise of an inherent power.244 In In re Juvenile
237. Id. (quoting Carrick, 125 Wash. 2d at 135, 882 P.2d at 177).
238. See In re Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 241–43, 552 P.2d 163, 168–69 (1976) (noting
similar overlapping functions between branches in both the federal and state systems, including
legislative control over appropriations (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 9; WASH. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 4), the executive power to veto (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12), and
the judicial authority to declare legislative and executive acts unconstitutional (citing United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–05 (1974))).
239. Moreno, 147 Wash. 2d at 505–06, 58 P.3d at 268 (quoting Carrick, 125 Wash. 2d at 135,
882 P.2d at 177).
240. Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 243, 552 P.2d at 170.
241. Moreno, 147 Wash. 2d at 506, 58 P.3d at 268.
242. Id. at 506, 58 P.3d at 268.
243. Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 750–51, 539 P.2d 823, 827–28 (1975). However, the
portion of the juvenile court employees’ collective bargaining agreement with the county that
pertained to hiring, firing, and working conditions was void as a matter of statutory interpretation.
Id. There, the employees’ status as state employees exempted them from the Public Employees’
Collective Bargaining Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 41.56. Id.
244. Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 251, 552 P.2d at 174; see also Hugh Spitzer, Court
Rulemaking in Washington State, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 31, 36 (1982) (arguing that separation
of powers principles should protect the judiciary’s sole power over court rulemaking only over
“those rules necessary to the very existence and functioning of the courts”).
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Director,245 the Lincoln County Superior Court ordered the Lincoln
County Board of Commissioners to increase the salary of the County’s
court-appointed juvenile services director.246 A neighboring superior
court judge affirmed the order based on testimony that the Lincoln
County juvenile services director’s salary was indeed lower than
juvenile services director salaries in other similarly sized counties.247
The Washington State Supreme Court reversed and held that the superior
court failed to meet the “clear, cogent and convincing” standard because
the court presented no evidence that the director’s salary was so
inadequate that the court could not fulfill its duties.248 Furthermore, the
court failed to show that it would be unable to hire a qualified candidate
at the commission’s determined salary.249 Although the superior court
exceeded its constitutional authority in this instance, In re Juvenile
Director also stands for the proposition that the legislature may not
impede the judicial branch from performing its constitutional duties by
unreasonably withholding funds necessary for the efficient
administration of justice.250
IV. WASHINGTON SHOULD RECOGNIZE A QUALIFIED
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Washington’s established separation of powers doctrine requires
gubernatorial executive privilege. Separation of powers alone, however,
should not define Washington’s executive privilege doctrine. Like the
Supreme Court of Ohio, the Washington State Supreme Court should
consider its state’s substantive constitutional provisions to inform its
doctrine. First, in recognizing the privilege, the Court should adopt the
familiar three-part framework set forth in United States v. Nixon that
most state supreme courts have adopted. Second, the Court should
broadly apply each category of demonstrated need that other courts
recognize as satisfying a requestor’s burden. Finally, once a requestor
has demonstrated a particularized need, the Court should acknowledge
that Washington’s populist roots favor openness. To avoid disclosure,
the Court should require the governor to show “clear, cogent, and
convincing” proof that the requested disclosure will interfere with
245. 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163.
246. Id. at 233, 552 P.2d at 164.
247. Id. at 233–34, 552 P.2d at 164–65.
248. Id. at 252, 552 P.2d at 175.
249. Id. at 234, 552 P.2d at 165.
250. Id. at 249–50, 552 P.2d at 173.
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performance of a constitutional function.
A.

The Ohio Supreme Court’s Executive Privilege Analysis Provides a
Useful Framework for Washington Because Both States Have
Powerful Governors and Robust Public Records Acts

Ohio’s and Washington’s constitutions create similar executive
departments.251 Both provide for multiple independently elected
executive officers,252 vest the “supreme executive power” in the
governor,253 permit the governor to demand information from officers of
the state,254 vest faithful execution of the laws in the governor,255 require
an annual gubernatorial address to the legislature,256 allow the governor
to convene a special legislative session,257 designate the governor
commander-in-chief of the state military,258 allow the legislature to
regulate the governor’s pardoning power,259 and provide a gubernatorial
line-item veto.260
Taken together, these provisions suggest an Ohio executive branch
roughly equal in power to the legislative and judicial branches.261
However, Ohio’s governor was not always so equal. It was only in 1903
that the governor gained the veto power.262 The Ohio Supreme Court
251. Although the executive departments of Washington and Ohio are constitutionally similar
today, the Ohio Constitution influenced a “lesser number of sections” of the Washington
Constitution than did other state constitutions. See Beardsley, supra note 228, at 362.
252. Compare OHIO CONST. art. III, § 1 (governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor
of state, treasurer of state, and attorney general), with WASH. CONST. art. III, § 1 (governor,
lieutenant governor, secretary of state, treasurer, auditor, attorney general, superintendent of public
instruction, and commissioner of public lands). However, Ohio’s governor and lieutenant governor
run on one ticket while Washington’s governor and lieutenant governor run separately. Compare
OHIO CONST. art III, § 1(a), with WASH. CONST. art. III, § 1.
253. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 2.
254. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 5. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected any
argument that this provision vested with the governor the power to determine whether any
communications are confidential and protected from disclosure. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472, 478–79
(Ohio 2006). In similar fashion, no other state grounds executive privilege in comparable provisions
or has analyzed intra-branch executive privilege claims against independently elected executive
officials. In states with independently elected executive officers, one might assume that political
differences may give rise to hostile intra-executive branch requests.
255. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 5.
256. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 7; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 6.
257. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 7.
258. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 8.
259. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 9.
260. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12.
261. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472, 483 (Ohio 2006).
262. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 16 (editor’s comment).
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now recognizes the line-item veto as a significant power-equalizing
force for the governor, “a power exceeding that of the President.”263 The
current equity of power between Ohio’s three branches of government
makes separation of powers arguments more compelling.264 Finally, like
Washington, Ohio also has a robust separation of powers doctrine
despite the absence of a specific constitutional provision establishing
that concept.265
These similarities are important to the development of an executive
privilege doctrine in Washington for three reasons. First, Ohio’s similar
constitutional structure makes the Ohio Supreme Court’s precedent more
persuasive in Washington than other state court precedent analyzing
potentially dissimilar constitutions.266 Importantly, the Ohio Supreme
Court has embraced executive privilege despite the fact that Ohio’s
constitution provides a further populist check on the executive office not
found in Washington’s constitution: executive officer term limits.267
Second, the Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis in State ex. rel. Dann v.
Taft (Dann I),268 demonstrates how constitutional history properly
informs executive privilege analysis. Had the Ohio governor been
subordinate to the General Assembly, as contemplated in the 1802 Ohio
State Constitution, the Ohio Constitution might not support executive
privilege.269 Washington’s unique populist history, like Ohio’s
amendment history, should inform whether its constitutional separation
of powers doctrine provides for executive privilege.
Finally, analogy to Ohio’s public records law may also be instructive.
The Ohio Public Records Act is “construed liberally in favor of broad
access, and any doubt is resolved in favor of disclosure of public
records.”270 Washington construes its Public Records Act similarly.271
Furthermore, Ohio excludes from the definition of “public record” those
“[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.”272
Washington similarly exempts from disclosure records where another

263. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 483.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 483–84 (quoting City of S. Euclid v. Jemison, 503 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Ohio 1986)).
266. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 198, at 340 n.119 and accompanying text; TARR, supra note
198, at 200 n.103 and accompanying text.
267. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 2.
268. 848 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 2006).
269. See id. at 483.
270. Id. at 477 (quoting Gilbert v. Summit Cnty., 821 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ohio 2004)).
271. See supra note 24.
272. OHIO REV. CODE § 149.43(A)(1)(v).

Marchisio - FINAL-with corrected into quote.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

10/26/2012 6:15 PM

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN WASHINGTON

845

statute “exempts or prohibits disclosure.”273 In the face of this liberal
construction, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized a qualified executive
privilege and corresponding three-step analysis common to federal and
state courts.274
B.

Washington’s Populist Roots Provide an Insufficient Basis for
Rejecting Executive Privilege, but They Should Inform the Way
Courts Balance Requestor Need Against Execution of the
Governor’s Constitutional Duties

Although Washington’s constitution provides populist checks against
government corruption and complacency,275 the specificity of these
checks limit their reach. Unlike the governor, who is vested with the
“supreme executive power” of the state,276 Washington’s citizens have
no similar general authority.277 Citizen checks on other branches are
limited to those enumerated in Washington’s constitution.278
Furthermore, when citizens act through initiatives and referenda, those
actions are simply legislative and receive no special status, constitutional
or otherwise.279 Thus, even the people’s constitutional power to make
laws does not give those citizen-initiated laws extra-statutory reach.280
Finally, when statutory rights are vindicated through judicial
enforcement, the separation of powers doctrine is implicated anew.281

273. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2012).
274. See supra notes 113–28 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 219–27 and accompanying text.
276. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 2. Washington’s legislature and judiciary also possess general
authority over their respective spheres of competence. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 (legislative
authority vested in legislature); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (judicial power vested in supreme court).
277. Although Washington’s constitution acknowledges “[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people,” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1, state plenary power is generally vested in the legislature, subject
only to express or implied limitations. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 210, at 16.
278. It would make little sense to refer to implied or inherent citizen powers when state plenary
power is vested in other branches of government. Id.
279. Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wash. 2d 284, 290–91 174 P.3d 1142,
1145 (2007).
280. See id. Similarly, the legislature’s adoption of a law, regardless of whether it seeks to
enhance the populist goals of the state constitution, is also subject to separation of powers. Thus,
apart from independently elected executive officers, no provision in Washington’s constitution
provides citizen oversight over the executive branch. One would expect standard separation of
powers analysis to apply to laws passed by initiative. See id. (concluding the populist initiative
process did not serve as a separate democratic check against the three traditional branches of
government, but merely constituted “legislative power that is coextensive with that of the
legislature”).
281. See supra notes 228–50 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, other state courts have not altered the three-part executive
privilege framework in the face of separate state public records acts.282
Like Ohio, Washington should adopt the federal three-part executive
privilege framework. Under this framework, the governor must first
invoke the privilege through a detailed privilege log describing the
document and explaining why its release would undermine gubernatorial
deliberations, policymaking, or decisionmaking.283 Documents that do
not merit privilege will not satisfy this process. For example, unsolicited
letters from the general public contained in an appointment file are not
presumptively privileged because they do not contain advisor
opinions.284 Similarly, reports containing only fact summaries do not
implicate executive-advisor candor.285 This process requires the
governor to put forth a reasonable explanation for the presumptive
privilege without overburdening the governor’s limited resources, which
would defeat the functional rationales underlying the privilege.286
Second, a requestor must demonstrate a particular need for specific
executive information to rebut the presumptive privilege. Here,
Washington’s populist history—with an emphasis on government
openness and citizen oversight—suggests courts should generously
construe a requestor’s asserted need.287 Because the governor already
has a qualified presumption in favor of privilege, placing an onerous
burden on requestors risks turning the qualified privilege into an
absolute privilege.
Washington courts should find a requestor’s demonstrated need
sufficient to rebut the presumptive privilege when it falls under a
recognized category meriting disclosure. Previously recognized
categories of sufficient need include evidence in criminal litigation,
evidence in civil litigation affecting individual rights, and allegations of
government wrongdoing.288 If a requestor’s demonstrated need does not
fall under a previously recognized category, then a requestor must show
282. See supra notes 170–87 and accompanying text.
283. The Washington State Supreme Court should decline to adopt a framework similar to
Cheney, which requires lower courts to narrow overly broad civil requests, in the PRA context. See
supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. While PRA requests may be “everything under the sky”
like civil discovery requests, id., they are statutorily created rights, WASH REV. CODE § 42.56.080
(2012), rooted in public policy, WASH REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2012).
284. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
286. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed concern that merely invoking executive
privilege could overburden the Office of the Vice President. See supra notes 76–83 and
accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 213–27 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 188–204 and accompanying text.
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that the gubernatorial withholding at issue would jeopardize the historic
commitment to the rule of law in the adversarial system of justice.289 To
a lesser degree, courts might also consider whether an instance of
gubernatorial withholding undermines a particular constitutional
principle290 or legislative policy.291
Third, once a requestor has demonstrated sufficient need, courts
should inspect the documents in camera to determine whether
disclosure—subject to redaction of irrelevant or otherwise protected
information—would impermissibly undermine the governor’s ability to
fulfill a constitutionally assigned duty.292 In re Juvenile Director
provides the clearest standard to analyze claimed separation of powers
violations. The Court held that a superior court could not compel a
county commission to raise salary levels unless it could show by “clear,

289. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
290. For example, Washington courts could also find particularized need when citizens seek
access to gubernatorial decisionmaking around issues of particular concern during the framing of
Washington’s constitution. Interactions between state government and business, under
Washington’s constitution, are presumptively suspect and citizens have a historically rooted interest
in oversight of relationships between government and business. See Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass’n
v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470, 487–88, 90 P.3d 42, 50–51 (2004). Similarly, access to the state’s
administration of the initiative and referendum process may necessarily constitute demonstrated
need because that process itself provides a constitutional citizen check on government overreach
and complacency. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
291. However, other state courts have been less receptive to this consideration. See supra note
200 and accompanying text.
292. Whether a gubernatorial duty is constitutionally assigned is itself a difficult question. The
supreme executive power is vested in the governor, WASH. CONST. art. III, § 2, with a
corresponding responsibility to “see that the laws are faithfully executed,” WASH. CONST. art. III,
§ 5. Other constitutional duties and powers include: requiring information in writing from other
state officers, WASH. CONST. art. III, § 5; delivering an annual message to the legislature, WASH.
CONST. art. III, § 6; convening special legislative sessions, WASH. CONST. art. III, § 7; serving as
commander-in-chief of the state military, WASH. CONST. art. III, § 8; exercising pardoning power as
regulated by the legislature, WASH. CONST. art. III, §§ 9, 11; exercising veto, entire-section veto, or
line-item appropriation veto powers, WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12; and filling vacancies in
appointive and other state offices, WASH. CONST. art. III, § 13. The governor also exercises limited
foreign affairs functions, including foreign sister state agreements and limiting economic activity
with a specific state, among others. See Ku, supra note 199. Foreign affairs may preclude in camera
review even after sufficient requestor showing. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. In
responding to a state of emergency or invasion, the governor’s constitutional duties may also be
implicated. See generally Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237, 240
(2006) (arguing that state executives possess inherent constitutional authority to respond during
times of crisis). Although the Washington governor’s power to respond to state emergencies is
regulated by statute, the legislature has broadly authorized gubernatorial responses. See WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 43.06.010, 43.06.200–.270 (2012); Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n v. State, 97 Wash. 2d 466,
472, 647 P.2d 481, 484 (1982). Professor Rossi suggests that any ambiguity under such a regime
should be resolved in favor of authorizing “state officials to act to address crisis-related issues based
on inherent executive power under state constitutions.” Rossi, supra at 258.

Marchisio - FINAL-with corrected into quote.docx (Do Not Delete)

848

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/26/2012 6:15 PM

[Vol. 87:813

cogent and convincing” proof that the commission’s failure to
appropriate jeopardized the court’s ability to fulfill an inherent
constitutional function.293 As with the county commission’s statutory
authority in In re Juvenile Director, requestors at this stage will have
authority through criminal discovery, civil discovery implicating
individual legal rights, or by plausibly alleging government
wrongdoing.294 Therefore, the governor should bear the burden of
showing through “clear, cogent and convincing” proof that the burden of
disclosure on her ability to execute a constitutionally assigned function
outweighs the benefits of the requestor’s demonstrated need.
The governor might look to the following factors to show that the
burden of a request outweighs the particular benefits of disclosure:
(1) whether the requested disclosure is broad or narrow;295
(2) whether other, less burdensome means are available for obtaining
the information sought;296
(3) whether the disclosure would be kept confidential by the
requesting party and the privilege could later be asserted to
protect future disclosures;297
(4) whether disclosure will blunt future advisor candor necessary for
effective gubernatorial decisionmaking;298
(5) whether disclosure will impede future executive investigations;299
and
(6) whether the alleged constitutional duty impeded by disclosure is
explicitly enumerated in the state constitution,300 implied by other
constitutional provisions,301 or delegated by the legislature.302
Finally, like other states,303 Washington should not recognize public
293. In re Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 252, 552 P.2d 163, 175 (1976). Importantly, this
burden was applied against the commission’s exercise of delegated state legislative authority to fix
compensation levels. Id. at 234, 552 P.2d at 166.
294. Recall that exemptions from disclosure under public records acts cannot be rebutted by the
underlying mechanisms in the acts themselves. See supra notes 200–04 and accompanying text.
295. See supra text accompanying note 64.
296. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
298. See Cox, supra note 47.
299. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 292.
301. For example, advisor candor may be implied from duties enumerated in the constitution.
See, e.g., supra note 49 and accompanying text.
302. See Rossi, supra note 292. Importantly, state governors generally possess only delegated and
not inherent authority. See WILLIAMS, supra note 198, at 304–06.
303. See supra notes 200–04 and accompanying text.
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records requests under the state’s Public Records Act (PRA) as
necessarily demonstrating requestor need. First, like Ohio,304
Washington’s PRA excuses disclosure of records where another statute
exempts or prohibits disclosure.305 As a constitutional doctrine,
executive privilege should qualify as an “other statute” exempting
disclosure.306 Second, PRA requests generally do not fall under any of
the specific categories of accepted need.307 Initiating a PRA request does
not necessarily implicate government wrongdoing, and denying a PRA
request does not necessarily burden a requestor’s constitutional rights or
undermine the adjudication of individual rights.
CONCLUSION
Washington’s populist beginnings counsel against unchecked
concentrated power within one branch of government. Despite this
history, the Washington State Supreme Court recognizes a separation of
powers doctrine that protects each branch’s ability to fulfill its
constitutional duties. The separation of powers doctrine demands, in
some cases, that one branch of government shield internal deliberations
from disclosure that threatens its very functioning. However, this
principle must be balanced against the populist value of facilitating
citizen oversight of government. The well-established three-part
executive privilege framework properly balances the competing citizen
interests in an executive branch that is able to execute state law
effectively with citizen oversight of executive officials.

304. See supra notes 270–74 and accompanying text.
305. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2012); see, e.g., Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of the
Att’y Gen., 170 Wash. 2d 418, 439–40, 241 P.3d 1245, 1255–56 (2010) (incorporating federal
statutes and federal regulations); Hangartner v. City of Seattle, 151 Wash. 2d 439, 453, 90 P.3d 26,
33 (2004) (incorporating another state statute); O’Connor v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 143
Wash. 2d 895, 912, 25 P.3d 426, 434–35 (2001) (incorporating court rules).
306. Yakima Cnty. v. Yakima Herald-Republic, 170 Wash. 2d 775, 808, 246 P.3d 768, 783
(2011) (recognizing in dicta that the argument for incorporating provisions in the federal Bill of
Rights as exemptions under WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) “has force”).
307. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.

